Multi Observation Flight

Thursday September 22, 2011 I observed Mike Digrazia in N978WC. The flight was really interesting. We went over engine out procedures in the air, on takeoff, and in the traffic pattern. It was really helpful to see and feel what it is like to actually lose an engine. To add to that it was very apparent that you need to know your flows and checklist procedures because when flying a twin engine there is so much that needs to be done in such a small amount of time that it is critical that you be on top of your game at all times.

In comparison from the simulator to the airplane, yes the simulator helps you figure what to do in the event of the emergency but the feel of losing an engine in any phase of flight is not the same as it is in the actual plane. There is no way that you can get the urgency that is felt in the airplane from flying in the simulator. This is the main point that I took away from the observation flight. 

It was cool to see, during the cruise engine failure, the prop being fully feathered and then watching it getting restarted in flight. Along with seeing how the aircraft reacted in the traffic pattern with the zero thrust configured and how on days like today in order to make the runway you actually have to bring the gear up to fly the pattern and the lower the gear on the base leg when you know the field will be made. For me that seems like a sketchy plan of action but if the gear does not come up then you will not be able to maintain altitude which will result in more troubles.

Overall the flight was very informative on how easy it is to get behind the airplane and in retrospect how hard it is to get caught up. The flight got me pretty stoked to fly the twin.

Aspen Arrival Accident

My initial thought of the accident into Aspen was wow...  This flight should have raised a flag right from the beginning. Having the passengers being late wasting time in the parking lot and the boss on the phone being extremely stern about the completion of the flight into Aspen and making the idea of going to the alternate (Rifle) not an option. There were many things that made this flight go south but pressures from the customers were what I felt the biggest issue.

The contributing factors that set up the accident are; ignorance from the passengers by being late, pressure to complete the flight from the boss, lack of situational awareness and experience into that airport for the time of arrival, lack of communication between the FAA and the control tower, and finally the weather.

The error chain was started at the beginning of the flight with the boss on the phone saying that is was extremely important that this flight went through, and with the pressure of the "importance" of the flight along with the weather made the judgments of the crew to be poor at best.

The captain should have told the customer (boss man) to take what he gets because the safety of the people on board is more important than the overpriced dinner party. With that being said, on the approach the captain and the first officer should not have executed the approach if they both didn't have the airport insight. I say this because it is apparent that the first officer didn't have the actual airport in sight when he called it out. The pilots should have also seen how far off course they were when descend through 1000 feet and should have gone missed from there. Something that raised question to me was; why did the flight crew allow a passenger to sit in the jump seat on the approach? That is just one distraction that didn't need to be their, plus if you screw up (like they did in this case) you gave that passenger a front row seat to crash.

If my job is on the line and I have to deal with stuck up clients that simply just don't care, I would be straight with them saying that with conditions permitting I will get them to their destination but if the conditions go awry then if they like it or not we were going to go to the alternate. In my opinion I would rather lose my job for doing the right thing than lose it and my life doing the wrong thing. I do realize that it is much easier to say this then actually do it but when it comes to an extreme the boss has to be reasonable and understand that safety comes first!

Single Pilot IFR

When it comes to single pilot IFR operations, I would consider flying in IFR conditions solo. Like the article states the more prepared you are for the flight the greater the chance for a successful outcome. With being a student of aviation, especially during the instrument rating, we have to prepare for each flight as if we were flying them solo. Having a flight instructor in the cockpit with you is good too help you if you get really far behind the airplane but with my experience the instructor only helps you out till you get caught up just enough to take over again. One tip that I got out from this article is with the equipment, only bring the bare essentials with don't bring the whole flight bag because orginization really helps with staying ahead of the airplane.

In-Flight Electrical Fire

In-Flight fires can be caused by the electrical system "Short Circuiting". This means that electricity has started to flow on a path that it was not supposed to. For example, if their is a damaged or exposed wire the electrical current can jump from that wire to another wire or a ground source. This then pulls an excessive amount of current through that damaged/exposed wire and can lead to a fire. 

Electrical Fire procedure for the Piper Seminole and the tips given in the AOPA Safety Brief are pretty similar. They both want you to turn off the main electrical switch and put out the fire and assess if the flight is safe without electrical power or not, and if it is then try and figure out where the problem lies and work around that. 

How I am going to handle electrical fires, in the event that I get one while flying, is just what the checklist states... not reset any popped circuit breakers and turn the battery master off and alternators off then resort to the checklist for proper coarse of action.